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Abstract
This paper constructs an entry and code−sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the
alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a
given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to
deter the entry of the potential entrants who have no significant cost advantage. This finding
suggests that the role of the alliance in entry deterrence should be considered carefully when
governments promote and maintain competition in the deregulated airline network markets.
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Promoting and maintaining competition in deregulated airline markets is an essential 
concern in many regions. The post-deregulation U.S. aviation industry can be 
characterized as being highly oligopolistic (Shy 2001). Billette de Villemeur (2004) 
indicates that in spite of the deregulation of the “third package” that occurred in 1992, 
there is still a very low level of competition in present European aviation markets. The 
new entrants (Sky-mark Airlines and Air-Do) in Japan’s deregulated airline markets are 
now suffering a deficit. 
    A stream of explanation for why the entry may be deterred or the new entrants 
may not survive has been offered by the previous literatures which focus on the 
adoption of the hub-spoke network. Oum et al. (1995) analyzes the effects of the 
strategic interaction between airlines on their network choice, and demonstrates that 
switching the network from a linear to a hub-spoke one will be useful in deterring entry. 
Hendricks et al. (1997) constructs an entry and exit game where the entrant enters into 
a spoke of the hub-spoke network operated by the incumbent, and shows that if the size 
of the network is large enough, a dominant strategy for the incumbent is not to exit 
from the spoke and the entrant is then forced to exit. Berechman et al. (1998) considers 
an entry game to show that changing the operating network from a fully connected 
network to a hub-spoke network can be used as a strategic device by the incumbent 
when it faces a threat of entry. 
In contrast to these previous studies focusing on the network structure, the focus 
of this paper is on the dramatic growth of the code-sharing alliances
1. In line with the 
fact that explosive numbers of code-sharing alliances have been concluded and some 
are even now being negotiated, a number of literatures have examined the economic 
effects of the code-sharing alliances. Among others, the theoretical analysis includes 
Park (1997), Brueckner (2001), and Lin (2004); empirical studies have been 
investigated by Youssef and Hansen (1994), Oum et al. (1996), Park and Zhang (1998), 
Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Park et al. (2001), and Park et al. (2003). However, 
according to my knowledge, there is little literature that argues the alliances issue based 
on the consideration of entry. In this paper, we try to construct an entry and alliances 
game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a 
significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network.   
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1.  Airline network and entry alliance game 
 
Let us consider a simple international hub-spoke network in which the issue of airline 
alliances and entry can be addressed. The network structure (depicted in Figure 1) in 
which the potential airline does not enter is similar to the hub-spoke network developed 
by Encaoua et al. (1996) and Lin (2004). There are three cities A, B and C, where cities 
A and B are located in the home country, and city C is located in a foreign country. 
                                                        
1 A code-sharing alliance is a strategic cooperation between two airlines whereby each airline's 
designated code is shown on his partner's flights. The code-sharing flights are ticketed and provided as if 
they occurred on one partner airline. For details relative to code-sharing agreements, see Barron (1997). 
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Individuals living in each city wish to travel to other cities, thus there is round-trip 
demand between each city pair (AB, BC and AC). On the supply side, an incumbent 
carrier (Airline 1) uses city B as its hub to operate the hub-spoke network. Under 
bilateral agreements, another foreign carrier (Airline 2) provides international flights 
between city B and C as well. Because there is no direct flight between city A and C, 
travelers who want to travel from A to C or from C to A (say AC passengers) have to 
connect at the hub-city B. The AC passengers can travel either by on-line connecting 
flights (i.e., flying on Airline 1 only) or by interline connecting flights (i.e., changing 
airlines at the hub-city B). Since the possibility of interline services exists, Airline 1 
competes with Airline 2 in the AC market for passengers to fly on its own BC flights. 
Thus there are three markets with different structure in the network before entry: direct 
domestic flight AB market (monopoly), direct international flight BC market (duopoly), 
and connecting flight AC market (partial duopoly).   
Due to the deregulation in the domestic airline market, it is supposed that there 
exists a potential entrant (Airline 3) in the AB market. We consider an entry and 
alliances game with two-stages. In the first stage, the potential entrant (Airline 3) 
decides whether to enter the domestic AB market. In the second stage, the incumbent 
Airline 1 makes the decision of allying with Airline 2
2. There are three possible cases 
to the game.   
 
Case-NE: Airline 3 does not enter, Airline 1 operates the hub-spoke network and 
competes with Airline 2. 
Case-E: Airline 3 enters on the domestic AB market, Airline 1 competes with 
Airline 2 and Airline 3 in each spoke. 
Case-EA: Airline 1 allies with Airline 2 and competes with Airline 3.   
 
Under the following assumptions, we will proceed to derive the outcomes for each case, 
respectively. And then use these outcomes to derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
 
2.2. Basic  assumptions 
 
Similar to the supposition that has been made in previous literature related to airline 
competition (e.g., Pels et al. 1997, Hendricks et al. 1997, and Lin 2004), the simple 
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2 It is also possible to expect that Airline 1 could ally with Airline 2 before the entry of Airline 3. 
However, in our model the alliance before entry will lead to a monopoly in the whole network and this 
possibility may be eliminated by the regulation under the anticompetitive concern. Bertrand-Nash competition without capacity constraint is supposed in our study. In a 
representative duopoly market, we either assume that the flights of both airlines are 
differentiated by the passengers due to the different departure times (see Encaoua et al. 
1996), or assume that the passengers exhibit brand loyalty to a particular airline (see 
Brueckner and Whalen 2000). Following the specification in Brueckner and Whalen 
(2000), it is assumed that a given passenger will fly on Airline   if the fare satisfies 
, where    represents the fare of Airline  , and   gives  the 
passenger’s monetary preference for Airlinei. If   is uniformly distributed over the 
interval 
i
j ≠ a p p
j i + <
i p ) , 2 , 1 ( i i i = a
a
[ α 2 , ] −α 2 , the demand of Airline   (represented by  ) can be generated 




j i i p p x − − = 2 1 . Note, that one feature of this formulation is that 
the total demand of the market is always equal to one. Fare differences serve only to 
divide this fixed total demand between the two airlines. Another feature is a small 
value   (a tight distribution of passenger’s preferences) makes the demand highly 
price sensitive. Without losing the generality of the analysis, let us assume that the 
reservation value of passengers on the monopoly market is large enough, and the 
demand of the monopoly market is always equal to one for convenience. 
α
Following Hendricks et al. (1997), and Lin (2004), the costs of Airline   
to operate a direct flight are given by a marginal cost   and by a fixed cost 
. For simplification, it is supposed that the marginal cost of each airline is the 
same (i.e.,  ), and the costs associated with entry are ignored (see Oum et al. 
1995, and Berechman et al. 1998).   
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3. Outcomes of three cases 
 
3.1. Outcome of non-entry case (Case-NE) 
 
In the network where Airline 3 does not enter, Airline 1 and Airline 2 compete not only 
in the BC market but also in the connecting AC market in which the possibility of 
interlining exists. Adopting the specification (sub-section 2.2) into the BC market, we 
have the demand functions as follows:   
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Similarly, the demand functions for AC market can be written as follows: 
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where   and   represents the demand of the passengers who travel by on-line 





  3 here, that we assume airlines adopt the discriminated fare strategy. Namely, Airline 1 
sells the AB flight ticket for , the BC flight ticket for , and the connecting AC 
flight ticket for  . To rule out the possibility that the connecting passengers choose 
to purchase two direct flight tickets instead of one connecting ticket, we impose the 
fare-arbitrage constraint   to Airline 1 (see Hendricks et al. 1997, 
Brucekner 2001, and Lin 2004). Further, since there is possibility of interlining, we 
assume Airline 2 sells interlining flight tickets. That is, Airline 2 sells the BC flight 
ticket to the BC passengers for  , while to the interlining AC passengers for  . 
To distinguish between BC and AC passengers, we impose the constraint   to 
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Given the demand functions for BC and AC markets (Eqs. (1)-(4)) and the cost 
structure of each airline, the profit-maximization problem of each airline could be 
formulated as follows: 
 
Airline 1:  (5) 
1 1 , AC BC p p
Max
1 1 1 1 ) 2 ) ( ( c p x c p p AC BC AB ⋅ − ⋅ − +
Airline 2:                       ( 6 )  
2 2 , BC BC s p
Max 2
2 1 2 ) ( F x c p AC BC − ⋅ −
+
 
In the monopoly AB market, it is assumed that Airline 1 charges monopoly fare  , 
which is supposed to be higher than the fare charged in the duopoly markets. Solving 
the above profit-maximization problem we obtain the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium listed 
in Table 1 (see Appendix A). In Table 1, the positive condition for the demand 
(0 ) is  1
, 2 1 < <
+ NE
AC x < m . We impose this constraint for    to Airline 1, since 
under the bilateral agreements concerning international traffic rights, Airline 2 may 
claim that too high a monopoly fare would eliminate Airline 2 from AC market
m p
4. Note, 
the profit of Airline 3 in Case-NE is represented byπ .  3 ≡
NE
 
3.2. Outcome of entry and non-alliance case (Case-E) 
 
Entry of Airline 3 leads to a duopoly in the domestic AB market. Adopting the 
specification in sub-section 2.2, the demand function for AB market can be written as 
follows. 
 
()                                        ( 7 )  
() () ( 1 2 1
3 3
AB AB p x − =α                                        ( 8 )  
 





                                                       
3 The above two constraints are satisfied at the unconstrained solution to Airline 1’s and Airline 2’s 
optimization problems, so these constraints do not need to be imposed explicitly. This can be confirmed 
from Appendix A. 
4  A similar pricing constraint under which a hub-spoke network operator can not eliminate the spoke 
operator carrier from the connecting market has been made by Encaoua et al. (1996). 
  4 ) 3 , 1 ( = i i  respectively. The demand function for BC market remains the same as Eqs. 
(1)-(2). In the connecting AC market, it is assumed that passengers who prefer on-line 
connecting flights will fly on Airline 1, while passengers who prefer interline 
connecting flights will fly on Airline 2 and Airline 3. Under this assumption, the 
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where    represents the demand of the passengers who travel by on-line connecting 
flights,   represents the demand for the passengers who travel by interline 
connecting flights.   represents the interline fare of Airline 3 charged on AC 
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The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium can be derived by solving the profit-maximization 
problem of each airline (see Appendix A-Table 2). 
  
 
3.3. Outcome of entry and alliance case (Case-EA) 
 
In this case, Airline 1 and Airline 2 entered into a contract to operate code-share flights 
on the BC market
5. Let us refer to the allied Airlines as “Airline 12” and assume that in 
Airline 12 a single decision-maker chooses the fares of their flights to maximize the 
joint profits. Furthermore, it is assumed that the alliance partners agree to equally share 
the profits from the BC market, and to share the profits from AC market with a share 
rate   due to the asymmetry. As well as the discriminated fare strategy 
assumption that has been made in the other cases, we assume that Airline 12 sells the 
AB flight ticket for  , the BC flight ticket for  , and the connecting AC flight 
ticket for  . While Airline 3 sells the AB flight ticket for   to AB passengers, 
and for    to AC passengers.   











In this case, the demand function for AB market remains the same as Eqs. (7)-(8). 
BC market becomes a monopoly. The demand functions for AC market now can be 
written as follows: 
 
                                                        
5  This type of alliance (parallel alliance) has been argued by Park (1997), and Brueckner (2001). 
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where    represents the demand of the passengers who travel by on-line connecting 
flights (i.e., flying on the allied Airline 12 only),   represents the demand for the 






    The profit-maximization problems of Airline 12 and Airline 3 are formulated as 
follows:   
 
Airline 12:   
1 12 , AB AC p p
Max 2 1+ Π
2 1
1 1 1 1 12 12 3 12 12 2 ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( F F x c p x c p x x c p AB AB AC AC AC BC BC − − ⋅ − + ⋅ − + + ⋅ − =
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Similarly, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium can be derived, and the equilibrium 
values are listed in Table 3 (see Appendix A).   
 
4.  Comparison of the outcomes 
 
According to Table 2 and 3, we give the following lemmas to show the effects on the 
fares, demands and airlines’ profits resulting from the alliance. 
 
Lemma 1. In the airline network where Airline 3 entered, and Airline 1 allied with 
Airline 2: 
(a) the fare of the international BC market rises from the duopoly fare to the monopoly 
fare. 
(b) in the connecting AC market, both the fare of the on-line connecting flights and 
interline connecting flights rises. Corresponding to these fare changes, the demand 
of on-line connecting flights increases, while the demand of interline connecting 
flights decreases. 
(c) the joint profits of the allied airlines increase (compared to the sum of the profits of 
these two airlines obtained in the pre-alliance equilibrium). While, the profits of 
Airline 3 decrease.     
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
Intuitively, the fare changes in the AC market can be explained based on the 
strategically substitutive and complementary relationship between Airline 12 and 
Airline 3
6. Airline 12 can raise the fare of BC flight   and the fare of the on-line 





                                                        
6  For the definition of strategic substitutes and complements, Bulow et al. (1985) is useful. 
  6 12’s fare-raising of   is to lower the interline fare   due to the strategically 
substitutive relationship, while the best response to Airline 12’s fare-raising of   is 
to raise the interline fare    due to the strategically complementary relationship with 
Airline 12. Airline 3’s interline fare   falls since the pressure of fare-lowering is 
stronger than the fare-raising. The total fare of interline connecting flights ( ) 
rises too, since the raising of    is larger than the lowering of  . The demand for 
on-line connecting flights increases while the demand for interline connecting flights 
decreases, since the fare-raising of the on-line connecting flights is smaller than the 
total fare-raising of the interline connecting flights. Thus fare and demand changes like 


























Further, according to Table 2 and 3 we have the following lemma to give a range 
of   (the share rate of profits from AC market between the allied airlines) in which 
the profits of each alliance partner increase, which means both airlines have the 
incentive to ally with each other. 
β
 
Lemma 2. There exists a range of   in  which π  and π≥ .  β
EA
1 ) (β ) (β
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
        From lemma 1 and 2, we have the following two propositions to show the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium to the entry and alliance game. 
 
Proposition 1. Given a sufficiently small fixed cost of the entrant (Airline 3) such that 
E EA NE
3 3 3 ) 0 ( π π π < ≡ , the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium consists of Airline 3 
entering and Airline 1 allying with Airline 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Give a sufficiently large fixed cost of the entrant (Airline 3) such that, 
, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium consists of Airline 1 
allying with Airline 2, and Airline 3 not entering.  
E NE EA
3 3 3 ) 0 ( π π π ≡ <
 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 describe that given a fixed cost, the entrant may 
obtain positive profits by entering into the domestic market in the first stage. However 
the positive profits may reduce to a negative value, due to the alliances between the 
incumbent airlines in the second stage. In other words, the incumbents can use the 
alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the potential entrants who have no 
significant cost advantage. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
 
The main result of our study that the alliances can be used as a credible commitment 
for entry deterrence has strong ties to the original insight of Dixit (1980) on the role of 
capital investment, as well as to the finding of Oum et al. (1995) and Hendricks et al. 
(1997) on the role of the hub-spoke network. The result of the present paper implies 
that the role of the alliance on the entry deterrence should be considered carefully when 
  7 governments promote and maintain competition in the deregulated airline network 
markets.   
 
 
Appendix A. Outcomes for three cases (Table 1-3) 
 
Table 1. The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with non-entry 
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Table 2. The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with entry 
 
  AB market  BC market  AC market 




AB + = =α 2 1
, 3 , 1  
   
() c p
E
AC 2 8 5
, 1 + =α 




AB + = =α 8 3
, 2 , 3  
Demands  2 1




AB x x   () 2 1




BC x x   8 5
, 1 1 =
+ E
AC x  
8 3
, 2 3 =
+ E
AC x  
Profits  () 1 1 2 64 57 F
E − =α π ,  ,   




BC + = =α 2 1
, 2 , 1
() 2 2 64 25 F
E − =α π () 3 3 64 25 F
E − =α π
 
Table 3. The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with entry and alliance 
 
  AB market  BC market  AC market 
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Proof for Lemma 1: 
According to Table 2 and 3, it can be easily shown that the condition for the changes of 
fares and demands like in lemma 1-b is  () α 8 3 > m p . Given the assumption that the 
monopoly fare is higher than the duopoly fare (i.e., () α 2 1 > m p ), these changes hold.   
Again, according to Table 2 and 3 we have 
 
() ( ) [] m m m
E E EA p p p ⋅ − − − − = + − Π + α α α α π π 92 ) 2 ( 64 450 576 1 ) ( 2 1 2 1         ( A . 1 )  
     () ( ) ( m m
E EA p p 8 3 8 21 576 1 3 3 − − = − α α π ) α π                           ( A . 2 )  
 
Recall the positive condition for the demands ( α ) 2 3 ( < m p ). It can be shown that Eq. 
(A.1) is positive and Eq. (A.2) is negative for any  () () α α 2 3 2 1 < < m p .        Q E D .  
 
Proof for lemma 2: 
According to Table 2 and 3, it can be shown that the condition for   is 
E EA
1 1 ) ( π β π≥
() () [] () () () [ ]
2 9 2 6 5 4 1 2 1 64 41 m m m S p p p α α α β β− + − ≡ ≥
E EA
2 2 ) ( π β π≥
, and the condition for 
 is  () () () [ ] () () ( .  ) [ ]
Here, we have a range of   where  ( ) for any β L S β β β≤ ≤ () () α α 2 3 2 1 < < m p . QED. 
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